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The existing literature identifies campaigns as an important tool of policy 
implementation for the Chinese Communist Party. However, scholars have yet to 
reach agreement about the effects of campaigns on policy outcomes. This paper 
helps to provide answers through an analysis of an affordable housing campaign 
adopted by the central government between 2011 and 2015. My findings are 
confirmed using regression analysis of a large original dataset that I compiled. The 
paper finds on one hand that the campaign strengthened the political incentives for 
local officials and they responded to the campaign by building more affordable 
housing. But the campaign’s effects varied across different types of localities, 
which led to a significant mismatch between the allocation of government resources 
and the actual needs of local residents. These findings point to the defects of 
campaigns and China’s need for more institutionalized mechanisms to implement 

















A unique feature of policy implementation in China, as long noted by students of Chinese 
politics and public policy, lies in the extensive use of campaigns, which has been described as a 
type of policy implementation involving extraordinary mobilization of resources under political 
sponsorship to achieve a specific policy target within a defined period of time.1 Campaign-style 
implementation in China is more abrupt, less institutionalized, and politicized compared with 
legal-bureaucratic implementation—the typical practice adopted in Western developed 
countries. Campaign-style implementation is widely used by the Party throughout a wide range 
of  policy areas, such as to reduce poverty,2 improve the environment,3 fight against corruption,4 
and enforce laws and regulations. 
  
Focusing on different policy areas, scholars have provided rich insights into the 
processes and mechanisms of post-Mao campaign-style implementation.5 However, scholars 
have not reached agreement on what policy outcomes campaigns achieve. While some have 
argued that campaigns effectively overcome conflicts of interest between national policymakers 
and local stakeholders and help bridge the gaps between policy objectives and outcomes,6 others 
 
1 Nicole Ning Liu, Carlos Wing‐Hung Lo, Xueyong Zhan and Wei Wang, “Campaign-style Enforcement 
and Regulatory Compliance,” Public Administration Review, 75, no.1 (2015): 85–95.  
  
2 Xiaobo Lü, “Social Policy and Regime Legitimacy: The Effects of Education Reform in China,” American 
Political Science Review, 108 (2014): 423–437.  
 
3 Benjamin van Rooij, Regulating Land and Pollution in China: Lawmaking, Compliance, and 
Enforcement: Theory and Cases (Amsterdam University Press, 2006). 
 
4  Andrew Hall Wedeman, “Anticorruption Campaigns and the Intensification of Corruption in China,” 
Journal of Contemporary China, 14, no. 42 (2005): 93–116; Jiangnan Zhu, Huang Huang and Dong 
Zhang, “‘Big Tigers, Big Data’: Learning Social Reactions to China's Anticorruption Campaign through 
Online Feedback,” Public Administration Review, 79 (2019): 500-513.  
 
5 Xueguang Zhou, “Yundongxing zhili jizhi: Zhongguo guojia zhili de zhidu luoji zai sikao” (The 
mechanism of campaign-style governance: rethinking the logic of state governance in China), Kaifang 
shidai [Open Times], 9 (2012); Shizheng Feng, “Zhongguo guojia yundong de xingcheng yu bianyi: jiyu 
zhengti de zhengtixing jieshi” (The formation and evolution of state campaigns in China: A regime-based 
explanation), Kaifang shidai [Open Times], 1 (2011); Martin Dimitrov, Piracy and the State: The 
Politics of Intellectual Property Rights in China (Cambridge University Press, 2009); Nicole Ning Liu, 
Carlos Wing‐Hung Lo, Xueyong Zhan and Wei Wang, “Campaign-style Enforcement and Regulatory 
Compliance,” Public Administration Review, 75, no.1 (2015): 85–95.   
 
6 Nicole Ning Liu, Carlos Wing‐Hung Lo, Xueyong Zhan and Wei Wang, “Campaign-style Enforcement 
and Regulatory Compliance,” Public Administration Review, 75, no.1 (2015): 85–95; Benjamin van Rooij, 
“Implementation of Chinese Environmental Law: Regular Enforcement and Political Campaigns,” 
Development and Change, 37, no.1 (2006):57–74. 
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have noted the limitations of campaigns, including their focus on the quantity rather than 
quality of results and a lack of public consultation.7 
 
In short, two questions about campaign-style implementation have not been 
satisfactorily answered. First, to what extent do campaigns effectively address the misalignment 
of interests between the national policy-makers and their local agents? Second, what policy 
outcomes do campaigns achieve in the targeted policy area? Empirically, most existing studies 
focus on case studies of only one or a few sites. While these can offer in-depth descriptions, they 
may point to different conclusions depending on case selection. To provide a more 
comprehensive picture about policy outcomes in campaigns, quantitative research based on 
large sets of data is also valuable.   
 
To address these gaps in the literature, this article focuses on the affordable housing 
campaign conducted by the Chinese government between 2011 and 2015, which aimed to provide 
36 million units of affordable housing within this five-year period to cope with skyrocketing 
housing prices and deteriorating housing affordability faced by urban residents. The paper 
examines bureaucratic behavior and policy outcomes in the campaign by comparing levels of 
local government spending on affordable housing provision across different localities. 
Examining this will enable us to evaluate the effectiveness of the campaign in addressing housing 
difficulties—the ultimate policy goal of the central government. 
 
Drawing on media reports and my own interviews with officials in various localities, I 
will develop two arguments regarding the policy outcomes achieved in the campaign. First, I 
argue that the campaign generated a political-mobilization outcome: political pressure and 
incentives embedded in the campaign motivated local officials at various levels of government 
 
7 Martin Dimitrov. Piracy and the State: The Politics of Intellectual Property Rights in China 
(Cambridge University Press, 2009); Benjamin van Rooij, Regulating Land and Pollution in China: 
Lawmaking, Compliance, and Enforcement: Theory and Cases (Amsterdam University Press, 2006); , 
Kristen E. Looney, “China’s Campaign to Build a New Socialist Countryside: Village Modernization, 




to step up their efforts in the provision of affordable housing, which was key to ultimately 
fulfilling the ambitious national target. In particular, it will be seen that local officials whose 
career prospects are more reliant on upper-level governments made greater efforts to 
implement the campaign. Second, the effect of the campaign varied across different types of 
localities: paradoxically, local officials responded more actively to the campaign in localities 
where societal demands for affordable housing were weaker, but less actively in localities 
where demands were stronger. This led to a resource-misallocation outcome: a significant 
mismatch between the distribution of government resources and the actual needs of citizens. 
Combining the two outcomes, my research shows that while campaigns strengthened local 
governments’ efforts to provide affordable housing, they also resulted in policy distortions and 
significantly compromised China’s effectiveness in addressing the affordability problem. 
 
I compiled a data set from online archives and various statistical yearbooks, containing 
local officials’ biographical information, details about land transactions and prices, and local 
spending on affordable housing for over 200 Chinese cities in 2013. First, the results show 
that city-level officials whose careers had been more dependent on the support of the 
provincial government, measured by these officials’ previous work experience at the provincial 
level, spent a larger part of their city’s budget, as well as more money on a per capita basis, on 
affordable housing. Second, the results also show that localities where the cost of land relative 
to average income was lower—rather than where residents faced greater housing difficulties—
have seen more resources spent on affordable housing.  
 
The above findings have important implications for the governance performance of the 
Party. After decades of rapid economic growth and social transformation, China still faces  
deficiencies in policy areas such as environmental protection and social welfare provision. 
This poses a threat to regime legitimacy and social stability, making it important for the Party 
to improve the way it governs. Some scholars suggest that despite China’s weak abidance of 
rule of law, the single-party political system is still well-suited for the effective implementation 
of economic and social development policies, providing an alternative to the legal-bureaucratic 
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governance model adopted in most Western developed countries.8 In line with this view, some 
empirical analyses have focused on how the Party’s political tools, in particular the cadre 
management system, contribute to effective policy implementation and governance.9 Through 
a nuanced analysis of how campaign-style implementation shapes bureaucratic behavior, my 
research suggests that, in contrast to everyday forms of governance, the CCP’s reliance on 
target-setting during campaigns, non-institutionalized assignment of tasks, and politicized 
mechanisms generate compromised policy outcomes. 
 
Campaign-style Policy Implementation in China 
Campaign-style implementation is different with the traditional legal-bureaucratic policy 
implementation model in two major respects. First, while legal-bureaucratic implementation 
is routinized and institutionalized based on formal rules and rationalized procedures, 
campaign-style implementation is disruptive and non-institutionalized. In campaigns, 
bureaucratic routines and existing institutional arrangements are often set aside and replaced 
by administrative measures that are often provisional and drastic. For example, in 
environmental campaigns, the government adopts what van der Kamp calls “blunt force” 
measures to reduce pollution, such as temporary closure of polluting plants and cutting off 
factories’ access to electricity and water. 10 These ad hoc measures aim to fulfill extraordinary 
policy targets within a defined short period,11 temporarily mobilizing massive administrative 
and financial resources, with significantly increased budgets and expanded manpower to  
 
8  Bo Rothstein, “The Chinese Paradox of High Growth and Low Quality of Government: The cadre 
Organization Meets Max Weber,” Governance, 28, no.4 (2015): 533–548. 
 
9 Yasheng Huang, Inflation and Investment Controls in China: The Political Economy of Central-
local Relations During the Reform Era (Cambridge University Press, 1999); Maria Edin, “State 
Capacity and Local Agent Control in China: CCP Cadre Management from a Township Perspective,” The 
China Quarterly, 173, no.3 (2003): 35–52; Cai Zuo, “Promoting City Leaders: The Structure of Political 
Incentives in China,” The China Quarterly, 224, no. 4 (2015): 955–984; Hongbin Li and Li-An Zhou, 
“Political Turnover and Economic Performance: The Incentive Role of Personnel Control in China,” 
Journal of Public Economics, 89, no.9–10 (2005): 1743–1762; Pierre F. Landry, Decentralized 
Authoritarianism in China (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
 
10 Denise van der Kamp, “Clean Air at what Cost? The Rise of ‘Blunt Force’ Pollution Regulation in China,” 
Paper presented at the American Political Science Association Annual Conference (2017). 
11 Shizheng Feng, “Zhongguo guojia yundong de xingcheng yu bianyi: jiyu zhengti de zhengtixing jieshi” 
(The formation and evolution of state campaigns in China: A regime-based explanation), Kaifang shidai 
[Open Times], 1 (2011). 
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enforce the campaign’s targets.12  
 
Another marked feature of campaign-style implementation lies in the extensive use of 
political tools. To mobilize bureaucratic compliance, campaigns rely heavily on command-
and-control mechanisms, in which higher-level government bodies assign binding policy 
targets to their subordinates and use political means to ensure their fulfilment.13 The 
assignment of targets is hierarchical, with the central government handing down assigned 
targets to provinces, and provincial governments assigning the targets they receive to cities 
and counties. The fulfillment of these targets is linked to local officials’ career prospects in an 
effort to overcome bureaucratic resistance to implementation. Local officials are often 
required to sign “responsibility contracts” with upper-level governments, holding themselves 
personally accountable for the fulfillment of the targets. Individual officials are rewarded or 
punished politically based on their performance in the campaign. Those with outstanding 
performance are likely to receive political benefits such as awards and promotion, while those 
with poor performance receive demotions, admonishments and warnings. Quite often, higher-
level governments also encourage inter-jurisdictional competition among lower-level officials 
to spur the latter’s efforts to deliver better and more rapid policy outcomes. 
 
Campaign-style implementation and legal-bureaucratic implementation are “ideal-
type” concepts and represent the two ends of a spectrum. In practice, implementation can 
contain features from both types, and may lean more towards campaign-style or legal-
bureaucratic from time to time.    
 
From the perspective of public policy theories, campaign-style implementation fits into 
 
12 Nicole Ning Liu, Carlos Wing‐Hung Lo, Xueyong Zhan and Wei Wang, “Campaign-style Enforcement 
and Regulatory Compliance,” Public Administration Review, 75, no.1 (2015): 85–95. 
 
13 Genia Kostka, “Command without Control: The Case of China’s Environmental Target System,” 
Regulation & Governance 10, (2015): 58– 74; Genia Kostka and Chunman Zhang, “Tightening the Grip: 
Environmental Governance under Xi Jinping,” Environmental Politics, 27, no.5 (2018): 769–781.  
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the political implementation scenario of Richard Matland’s “ambiguity-conflict” model of 
policy implementation. According to this model, when policy goals are specified by 
policymakers with a low level of ambiguity while implementation faces great conflicts or 
resistance among the different stakeholders involved, the adoption of political tools such as 
special rewards and coercive mechanisms is conducive to successful implementation. As a 
result, policy outcomes are largely determined by the power relations and bargaining among 
these stakeholders.14  
 
The CCP has a long tradition of using campaign-style implementation to achieve 
various political and policy goals. During the Maoist era, the Party adopted campaigns to 
conduct land reform, promote agricultural collectivization, and carry out struggle against 
“class enemies”. After Mao’s death, campaigns have remained a common practice of the Party, 
although several profound changes have occurred, transforming campaigns into a different 
type of political practice. While campaigns during the Maoist period were largely political, 
often involving the use of violence against targeted groups among the populace and/or the 
purges of officials, in the post-Mao period they have largely become a mechanism for policy 
implementation and to strengthen legal and regulatory enforcement.15 While campaigns in the 
Maoist era often involved mass mobilization of ordinary people, today they tend to be 
confined within the party-state apparatus, which probably reflected post-Mao leaders’ strong 
concerns with the deleterious effects of mass mobilization on social and political stability.16 
 
In short, the Party today adopts campaigns to tackle weak implementation in important 
policy areas and to address problematic policy outcomes that could potentially undermine 
 
14 Richard E. Matland, “Synthesizing the Implementation Literature: The Ambiguity-conflict Model of 
Policy Implementation,” Journal of public administration research and theory, 5, no. 2 (1995): 145–174. 
 
15 Yuhua Wang and Carl Minzner, “The Rise of the Chinese Security State,” The China Quarterly, 222 
(2015): 339–359; Martin Dimitrov, Piracy and the State: The Politics of Intellectual Property 
Rights in China (Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
 
16  Elizabeth J. Perry, “From Mass Campaigns to Managed campaigns: Constructing a New Socialist 
Countryside,” in Sebastian Heilmann and Elizabeth J. Perry eds, Mao’s Invisible Hand: The Political 
Foundations of Adaptive Governance in China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011): 30–61. 
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regime legitimacy and social stability. They simultaneously serve several objectives: to rapidly 
strengthen implementation in the targeted policy area; to promote policy awareness among both 
officials and the populace at large; 17  to demonstrate government responsiveness and 
accountability;18 and to boost the prestige of individual leaders.19 
 
It should also be noted that campaign-style implementation is not unique to China; it is 
widely adopted in other regimes and even democratic countries. For example, many 
governments adopt campaigns that combine intense enforcement and publicity to address 
drunk driving and speeding.20 Most recently, Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte conducted 
a national campaign using violent extrajudicial means to crack down on drug trafficking, killing 
thousands of suspects without trial in less than a year. However, campaign-style 
implementation is particularly common in China and is one of the ruling party’s most important 
governance tools. Besides the long tradition of using campaigns, the regime’s weak rule of law—
and thus the lack of effective rule-of-law-based policy implementation—and the deeply 
entrenched conflicts of interest between central policymakers and local bureaucrats have both 
contributed to the prevalence of campaign-style implementation.21 
 
Many writers view campaigns as an effective mechanism to bridge the gaps between 
policy objectives and implementation. For example, Liu et al. praised environmental 
 
17 Nicole Ning Liu, Carlos Wing‐Hung Lo, Xueyong Zhan and Wei Wang, “Campaign-style Enforcement 
and Regulatory Compliance,” Public Administration Review, 75, no.1 (2015): 85–95.  
 
18 Shizheng Feng, “Zhongguo guojia yundong de xingcheng yu bianyi: jiyu zhengti de zhengtixing jieshi” 
(The formation and evolution of state campaigns in China: A regime-based explanation), Kaifang shidai 
[Open Times], 1 (2011). 
 
19 Jiangnan Zhu, Huang Huang and Dong Zhang, “‘Big Tigers, Big Data’: Learning Social Reactions to 
China's Anticorruption Campaign through Online Feedback,” Public Administration Review, 79 (2019): 
500-513. 
 
20 Richard Tay, “The Effectiveness of Enforcement and Publicity Campaigns on Serious Crashes Involving 
Young Male Drivers: Are Drink Driving and Speeding Similar?” Accident Analysis & Prevention, 37 no.5 
(2005): 922–929. 
 
21 Xueguang Zhou, “Yundongxing zhili jizhi: Zhongguo guojia zhili de zhidu luoji zai sikao” (The 
mechanism of campaign-style governance: rethinking the logic of state governance in China), Kaifang 
shidai [Open Times], 9 (2012). 
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enforcement campaigns for effectively aligning local officials’ compliance and enforcement 
behavior with the regulatory demands of the central government. 22  Ahlers and Schubert 
similarly argued that the “Building a New Socialist Countryside” campaign generated outcomes 
that fit not only the policy objectives of the central government but also local conditions.23 In 
contrast, other scholars have paid more attention to the drawbacks of campaigns. Dimitrov, for 
example, argued that government campaigns on intellectual property rights (IPR) enforcement 
encouraged local bureaucrats to increase the quantity but not necessarily the quality of their 
enforcement actions. 24 Furthermore, campaigns, while offering quick results in the short term, 
hinder long-term routine enforcement mechanisms and may also undermine the rule of law.25 
Finally, observing how rural development campaigns, such as the “New Socialist Countryside 
Program” and the “Village Redevelopment Program”, were implemented, Looney and 
Rosenberg both noted strong government domination and weak public involvement leading to 
distorted policy objectives and unpopular outcomes. 26   
 
 Most existing research tends to adopt case studies conducted in one or a small number 
of localities. As will be discussed in the following sections, campaigns generate different 
bureaucratic behavior and policy outcomes across different types of localities, depending in part 
on the different incentive environments faced by local officials and non-institutionalized 
political bargaining between different layers of the government. To capture such cross-regional 
variations, it is important to adopt a comparative perspective that covers a wide range of 
 
22 Nicole Ning Liu, Carlos Wing‐Hung Lo, Xueyong Zhan and Wei Wang, “Campaign-style Enforcement 
and Regulatory Compliance,” Public Administration Review, 75, no.1 (2015): 85–95.  
 
23 Anna L. Ahlers and Gunter Schubert, “Effective Policy Implementation in China’s Local State,” 
Modern China, 41, no.4 (2015): 372–405. 
 
24 Martin Dimitrov. Piracy and the State: The Politics of Intellectual Property Rights in China 
(Cambridge University Press, 2009).  
 
25 Martin Dimitrov. Piracy and the State: The Politics of Intellectual Property Rights in China 
(Cambridge University Press, 2009); Genia Kostka and Chunman Zhang, “Tightening the Grip: 
Environmental Governance under Xi Jinping,” Environmental Politics, 27, no.5 (2018): 769–781.  
 
26 Kristen E. Looney, “China’s Campaign to Build a New Socialist Countryside: Village Modernization, 
Peasant Councils, and the Ganzhou Model of Rural Development,” The China Quarterly, 224, no.12 
(2015): 909–932. Lior Rosenberg, “Why Do Local Officials Bet on the Strong? Drawing Lessons from 
China’s Village Redevelopment Program,” The China Journal, 74 (2015): 18-42. 
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localities. The empirical analysis of this article uses city-level data. 
 
The Affordable Housing Campaign 
 
China’s affordable housing policy was established in 1998, the same year the central 
government initiated a market-oriented housing reform. Before the reform, the government 
provided housing for urban residents through “work units” (danwei) such as government 
departments or state-owned enterprises. The housing reform replaced the socialist provision of 
housing dominated by danweis with market provision dominated by commercial property 
developers. Existing publicly-owned housing was privatized. In the meantime, the government 
also established the affordable housing policy to target urban residents facing housing 
difficulties.27 
 
The policy framework established in 1998 for affordable housing included two major 
types: “economical and comfortable housing” (jingji shiyong fang, hereafter ECH) and “cheap 
rental housing” (lianzu fang, hereafter CRH). ECH is ownership-based affordable housing, 
built by real-estate developers on land plots provided by the government free of charge and 
subsequently sold to mid- to low-income households at subsidized prices. CRH refers to 
subsidized rental housing or rent subsidies provided to “low-income households with housing 
difficulties” (di shouru zhufang kunnan hu). Both types of affordable housing are provided only 
to residents who have local urban hukou; migrants are not eligible.28 
 
Several adjustments to the above policy framework took place during the following two 
decades. In 2007, the government issued an important policy document to set clearer criteria 
for different types of affordable housing.29 It closed several loopholes in the previous policy to 
achieve more effective targeting. It also required local governments to spend more on affordable 
 
27 Ya Ping Wang and Alan Murie, “The New Affordable and Social Housing Provision System in China: 
Implications for Comparative Housing Studies,” International Journal of Housing Policy, 11, no. 3 
(2011): 237–254. 
 
28 Ya Ping Wang and Alan Murie, “The New Affordable and Social Housing Provision System in China: 
Implications for Comparative Housing Studies,” International Journal of Housing Policy, 11, no. 3 
(2011): 237–254. 
 
29 State Council. 2007. No. 24. Guowuyuan guanyu jiejue chengshi di shouru jiating zhufang kunnan de 




housing, including at least 10% of the revenue they received through land sales to real-estate 
developers. In 2010, the central government began to promote two additional types of 
affordable housing: “public rental housing” (gongzu fang, or PRH), for which migrant workers 
were also eligible, and “shanty town redevelopment” (penghuqu gaizao), to meet the housing 
needs of different segments of the urban population with housing difficulties.30  
Even so, the programs still largely failed to achieve the government’s housing goals. This 
is mainly because the decisions to provide affordable housing were left to the discretion of the 
local government, which had to undertake the costs of building affordable housing using local 
budgets. Under the Party’s cadre management system that rewards local leaders for economic 
development, local officials have had little incentive to prioritize spending on affordable 
housing. The lack of incentives was exacerbated by the need of the local government to provide 
land for the construction of affordable housing. Land is valuable and an important source of 
revenue for local governments,31 and officials strongly preferred selling land on the market to 
providing it free of charge for the construction of affordable housing. As a result, the building of 
affordable housing had lagged far behind that of commercial housing. Between 1997 and 2007, 
while the annual supply of commercial housing on the private market had grown tenfold, the 
provision of ECH remained largely unchanged.32 The development of CRH was even slower.33 
This is because unlike ECH apartments, which are for sale and thus part of the city’s investment 
can be recovered, CRH apartments can only be rented out, and the construction costs of 
building CRH cannot be recovered within a short period. It is estimated that as of 2010, a dozen 
years after the program was announced, only 2.8% of low-income households in Beijing lived in 
CRH.34 
In the context of soaring house prices in Chinese cities, the inadequate provision of 
 
30 Youqin Huang, “Low-income Housing in Chinese Cities: Policies and Practices,” The China Quarterly, 
212, no. 12 (2012): 941–964.  
 
31 For a comprehensive analysis of land institutions in China and the importance of land to the local 
government,see Meg Rithmire, Land Bargains and Chinese Capitalism: The Politics of Property Rights 
under Reform (Cambridge University Press, 2015). 
 
32 Joyce Yanyun Man, “Affordable Housing in China,” Land Lines, 23 (2011): 16-20. 
 
33 Ya Ping Wang and Alan Murie, “The New Affordable and Social Housing Provision System in China: 
Implications for Comparative Housing Studies,” International Journal of Housing Policy, 11, no. 3 
(2011): 237–254. 
 
34 Youqin Huang, “Low-income Housing in Chinese Cities: Policies and Practices,” The China Quarterly, 
212, no. 12 (2012): 941–964.  
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affordable housing poses serious challenges.35 In 2013, house prices in large- and medium-size 
cities were around four times higher than a decade earlier, and the price increases were even 
more dramatic in major cities such as Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and Shenzhen.36 In a 
survey conducted by the central bank in 2010 among the residents of 50 cities, over three-quarters 
of respondents considered housing prices “too high to accept”37. During the annual meeting of 
the National People’s Congress in 2010, the Minister of Housing and Urban-Rural Development 
(MOHURD), warned that “too high and too rapid a rise in house prices may cause social 
instability.”38  
This realization prompted the Party and central government to raise affordable housing 
provision as a top policy priority. In 2011, the government put forward an ambitious plan to 
build  36 million affordable housing units within five years—including ECH, CRH, PRH and 
shanty town redevelopment—and pledged to cover 20% of urban households.39 The plan was 
announced by then-Premier Wen Jiabao in February 2011 during the annual meeting of the 
National People’s Congress.40  
 
The party-state embarked on a nationwide campaign entailing massive mobilization of 
financial and administrative resources and use of the highly politicized command-and-control 
mechanism, to ensure 36 million units of affordable housing actually got built. Over the five 
years between 2011 and 2015, the central government spent over two trillion yuan on this, of 
which a trillion yuan was in the form of fiscal subsidies devoted to affordable housing, with 
 
35 Wei Shi, Jie Chen and Hongwei Wang, “Affordable Housing Policy in China: New Developments and New 
Challenges,” Habitat International, 54 (2016): 224–233. 
 
36 Hanming Fang, Quanlin Gu, Wei Xiong, and  Li-An Zhou, “Demystifying the Chinese Housing Boom,” 
NBER Macroeconomics Annual 30 (2016): 105-166. Jing Wu, Yongheng Deng, and Hongyu Liu, “House 
Price Index Construction in the Nascent Housing Market: the Case of China,” The Journal of Real Estate 
Finance and Economics, 48, no.3 (2014): 522-545. 
 
37 “Central Bank Survey: 75.5% of residents deem house prices as high; satisfaction level reaches lowest 
among 11 years”, available at http://news.fang.com/2010-12-16/4206912.htm, accessed on April 30, 
2016. 
 
38 “Jiang Weixin: Too high and too rapid rise of house price may cause social instability”, available 
at http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2010-03-08/163919817501.shtml, accessed on March 6, 2016. 
 
39 Strictly speaking, the central government had begun to assign numerical targets for affordable housing 
construction among local governments since 2009, but it is in 2011 that central government significantly 
escalated its effort with a unprecedentedly ambitious national plan.  
 
40 This commitment was reiterated by President Xi Jinping during a Politburo meeting in October 2013. 
See http://finance.sina.com.cn/china/20131031/020117171228.shtml, accessed on April 30, 2016.  
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another trillion matched by local governments. Table 1 summarizes the fiscal spending by 
central and local governments on affordable housing and the numbers of units of affordable 
housing completed between 2011 and 2015, and also for the period before 2011 where data is 
available.41 As a result of the enormous investment, construction had started since 2011 on over 
40 million units of affordable housing, of which 29 million units were completed by 2015. In 
the single year of 2011, the number of affordable housing units under construction reached over 
10 million, a figure nearly equal to the total amount of affordable housing constructed over the 
previous period between 1994 and 2008.  
 
[Table 1 about here.] 
 
 
Intense media coverage publicized the sheer scale of the campaign. Figure 1 shows the 
frequency of media coverage on affordable housing published in Chinese newspapers between 
2000 and 2015. The data used in this figure come from a search of articles published in 602 
national and local newspapers during this period for the key phrase “guaranteed [affordable] 
housing”  (“保障房” and its longer variants “保障性住房” or “住房保障”).42 As Figure 1 shows, 
the affordable housing issue began to be widely publicized beginning in 2007, peaking in 2011 
as the housing campaign got underway. Because most newspapers are either owned or 
controlled by the government, the intensity of coverage that year and in the following years 
reflects the central government’s efforts to promote policy awareness of the campaign, which in 
turn helped enhance government legitimacy. 
 
[Figure 1 about here.] 
 
To fulfil the ambitious national target, the MOHURD assigned annual targets among 
the provincial-level governments, specifying the number of units each province was required to 
build within a year. Each province then assigned the target it received to prefecture-level cities, 
which further assigned targets downwards to counties and small cities. The assignment of 
 
41 The data presented here combine spending from both the government’s general budget (yiban 
gonggong yusuan) and a special fund budget (jijin yusuan), based on statistics made available on 
the website of the Ministry of Finance. For example, the data on affordable housing expenditure 
in 2014 is available at 
http://zhs.mof.gov.cn/zhengwuxinxi/zonghexinxi/201504/t20150407_1213602.html, accessed 
on January 30, 2017. 
 
42 The data is collected from the newspaper articles in the China Knowledge Resource Integrated 
Database (Zhongguo zhiwang). The database includes all articles published in over 600 national and 
local newspapers since 2000. 
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targets typically followed two steps: first, officials in lower-level governments submitted plans 
to the upper level to report how many units they were willing to construct. Second, since the 
self-reported targets often fell short of the goals of the upper-level governments, negotiations 
commenced with the subordinate governments, offering additional incentives and imposing 
stronger political pressure to demand higher targets. The negotiation process was shaped by 
the political and economic interests of the governments at the higher and lower levels as well as 
the interpersonal relationships among individual officials.  
 
Once the targets were determined, top-down command-and-control mechanisms were 
adopted to ensure their fulfillment in a timely manner. Every year, lower-level officials signed 
“affordable housing work target and responsibility contracts”43 (zhufang baozhang gongzuo 
mubiao zerenshu) with their supervisors.44 The contracts stipulated the numbers of various 
types of affordable housing the lower-level government was required to build within the 
contract year. They sometimes also included targets related to other aspects of the affordable 
housing policy, such as the rate of completion and the occupancy rate. Other targets were more 
vaguely specified, such as housing quality and matching infrastructure. Local officials’ success 
in accomplishing these targets was linked with their performance evaluations and thus their 
career prospects. The central government disciplined provincial officials who failed to achieve 
their targets and rewarded those who did achieve them. The evaluation system was hierarchical, 






This section empirically examines local governments’ spending behavior and policy outcomes 
in the affordable housing campaign. Based on the existing literature, media reports, my original 
interviews conducted in various provinces including Heilongjiang, Guangdong and Guizhou, 
and statistical analysis of a large dataset that I have compiled, I propose the argument that while 
 
43 Youqin Huang, “Low-income Housing in Chinese Cities: Policies and Practices,” The China Quarterly, 
212, no. 12 (2012): 941–964. 
 
44 At the central level, the responsibility contracts were signed between the MOHURD and provincial 




the campaign indeed strengthened the local officials’ efforts on affordable housing provision, it 
failed to effectively address the problem of interest misalignment between central and local 
governments and, moreover, led to systematic incentive distortions and goal displacement by 
local officials.  
 
More specifically, since building 36 million units became a serious political commitment 
by the Party’s leadership, and fulfilling the quantitative targets in a timely manner was tightly 
linked to cadre performance evaluation, local officials prioritized target fulfillment to other 
aspects of policy outcomes, such as the fairness of allocation, infrastructure, and housing 
quality. The political imperative of fulfilling the targets encouraged officials to “muddle 
through”—they adopted “coping behaviors such as selective implementation, distortion or 
fabrication of records which would induce a decoupling of symbolic compliance from 
substantive compliance, and the pursuit of short-run gains at the expense of long-term 
benefits.” 45 
 
Moreover, the assignment of targets across different localities involved a non-
institutionalized bargaining process between different levels of the government. The imperative 
of meeting the targets prompted officials in both the central and provincial governments to 
focus primarily on how many units were built rather than where they were built. In other words, 
for higher-level governments, one additional unit in a small town was treated with little 
difference with one in a major city. The lack of sufficient institutionalization therefore left ample 
room for local officials to negotiate with superiors about their own targets. More specifically, 
local officials weigh the political benefits of building more affordable housing against the costs 
incurred to their own budgets. The calculations of costs and benefits encouraged local officials to 
make strategic decisions in affordable housing provision, and such strategic decisions have led to 
three observable empirical implications. 
 
First, local officials often adopted certain expedient strategies that could help them 
meet the target of affordable housing at lower cost. Examining the affordable housing projects 
in Beijing, Chen et al. and Dang et al. find that these projects are typically located at the urban 
 
45  Xueguang Zhou, Lian Hong, Ortolano Leonard, and Yinyu Ye, “A Behavioral Model of ‘Muddling 




fringes, where housing prices are relatively low, leaving districts with higher house prices 
insufficiently covered.46 Such practices reflect the unwillingness of local governments to 
devote land at the premium location to affordable housing. Moreover, both media reports and 
my own fieldwork suggest that it is a common practice for local governments to build so-called 
“designated affordable housing” (dingxiang baozhang fang, 定向保障房): that is, affordable 
housing constructed exclusively for designated groups such as public sector or state-enterprise 
employees.47 Many of the beneficiaries in these groups did not belong to the mid- or low-
income population, therefore violating the allocation principle stipulated in the national 
policy. From the perspective of the local government, the advantage of designated affordable 
housing is that it helps shift part of the expenditures to the public agencies and state-owned 
enterprises that were the beneficiaries, recovers the construction cost more rapidly by selling 
the units to financially better-off customers, and provides benefits to the local government’s 
own public-sector employees while at the same time fulfilling the policy targets.  
 
Second, career interests became an important motivation driving the local officials’ 
efforts in the campaign. Before the campaign, local leaders rarely perceived affordable 
housing projects as beneficial to their career prospects—promoting economic growth and 
raising government revenue were the most important priorities. The campaign marked a 
significant shift of incentives. Ambitious local officials began to view affordable housing 
projects, especially on a massive scale, as achievements that could be shown to their superiors 
to demonstrate their competence and loyalty. Some local officials pursued affordable housing 
in disregard of local financial conditions and the actual demand for such housing.48 Therefore, 
 
46 Mingxing Chen, Wenzhong Zhang, and Dadao Lu, “Examining Spatial Pattern and Location Choice of 
Affordable Housing in Beijing, China: Developing a Workable Assessment Framework,” Urban Studies, 52, 
no.10 (2015): 1846–1863; Yunxiao Dang, Zhilin Liu, and Wenzhong Zhang, “Land-based Interests and 
the Spatial Distribution of Affordable Housing Development: The Case of Beijing, China,” Habitat 
International, 44 (2014): 137–145. 
 
47 Interviews in Guangdong and Guizhou, July 2018. Also see, for example, “Hainan Gongwuyuan xiaoqu 
lieru baozhangxing zhufang” (Hainan civil servant housing project being listed as affordable housing), 
Zhongguo Qingnan Bao [China Youth Daily], available at  http://zqb.cyol.com/html/2011-
03/22/nw.D110000zgqnb_20110322_1-05.htm, accessed on August 19, 2019 and “Baozhang fang he fuli 
fang: bianjie zai nali” (“Where is the boundary between affordable housing and welfare housing”), 
Dongfang Zaobao [Oriental Morning Post], available at 
http://finance.ifeng.com/money/roll/20120831/6969768.shtml, accessed on August 19, 2019. 
 
48 For example, at the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference’s (CPPCC) annual meeting in 
2015, Xu Junjian, a deputy to the Conference, criticized the practice of affordable housing provision as 
dominated by local leaders’ will and disregarding the actual need, and such practice, he argued, led to the 
oversupply of affordable housing and waste of public resources in many places. See “Zhengxie weiyuan 
Xu Junjian: baozhang fang kongzhi cheng zhengji gongcheng, ke gaicheng anxu dingjian” (CPPCC deputy 
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the campaign did achieve a political mobilization effect, motivating local officials to provide 
more affordable housing. However, not all local officials responded equally to the political 
mobilization. According to interviewees who are officials in Heilongjiang and Guizhou 
Provinces, the behavior of local officials varied greatly in the intergovernmental bargaining 
over the allocation of affordable housing targets—those whose career prospects relied more on 
the support of the upper-level government and/or had closer personal connections with 
provincial leaders responded more actively.49 
 
Third, the effects of the campaign varied across different types of localities. Localities 
where the cost of land was lower—which also means that local residents likely faced lower 
barriers to buying their own housing—responded more enthusiastically to the campaign. The 
largest component in the cost structure of affordable housing lies in the cost of land, which 
includes both the actual cost of acquiring land from existing land users and the opportunity 
cost given that the local government would be sacrificing the revenue it would obtain if the 
land was sold to real-estate developers. As a result, local officials in localities where the cost of 
land was higher were generally less willing to build affordable housing. These localities tended 
to be major cities where local residents faced the greatest housing difficulties. By contrast, 
local officials in smaller and less developed cities—where the cost of land was relatively 
lower—were much more enthusiastic about building affordable housing, as the officials could 
gain the political capital for career advancement at relatively lower cost. Many “third-tier” and 
“fourth-tier” cities are reported to have constructed excessive units of affordable housing, 
which had to be left unoccupied or sold to households that did not qualify due to insufficient 
demand from qualified residents.50 Due to such cost-benefit considerations among local 
officials, the supply of newly built affordable housing failed to match local demands. Officials 
at all levels of the government have long been aware of this problem but have had little 
 
Xu Junjian: empty affordable housing becomes political achievement projects and should be built based 
on actual need), Pengpai [The Paper], available at 
https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_1308763, accessed on August 20, 2019. 
 
49 Interviews in Heilongjiang, August 2015 and in Guizhou, July 2018. 
 
50 For example, see “Xuqiu youxian houqi nanguan: san- sixian chengshi jian baozhang fang 
yinggai yindi zhiyi” (Limited demand and difficult management: affordable housing construction in 
third- and fourth-tier cities should consider local conditions), Jingji Cankao Bao [Economic 
Information Daily], available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/finance/2016-
01/28/c_128677709.htm, accessed on June 29, 2016. 
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incentive to address it, given the strong political pressure they faced to fulfill the campaign 
targets in time. 
 
It should be noted that while such policy distortions and misallocation of resources are 
by no means unique in campaign-style implementation, a campaign’s ambitious target setting, 
non-institutionalized assignment of tasks and command-and-control mechanisms exacerbate 
the distortions and misallocations. Before the campaign, when political pressures to build 
housing were low, local officials had few career incentives to build affordable housing, and the 
housing that did get built was normally in the wealthiest cities that could afford it. For 
example, Beijing was a pioneer in affordable housing development before the campaign. 
Between 1998 and 2005, affordable housing contributed to 10-18 per cent of the new housing 
built in the city.51 This is dramatically different with the pattern observed during the 
campaign, in which smaller and poorer cities demonstrated much stronger activism in 
affordable housing provision and constructed a higher proportion than did the large cities. 
 
 
Data and Variables 
 
To test my arguments statistically, this section analyzes the patterns of the local governments’ 
expenditures on affordable housing in 280 Chinese cities in 2013. 52  These cities include 
prefectural-level and vice-provincial-level cities in all provinces except Tibet and Xinjiang.53  
 
The dependent variable of the analysis seeks to capture the spending by a city’s 
government on constructing affordable housing. I measure this first on a per capita basis and 
then as the share of total local fiscal expenditure, as the dependent variable. The term “fiscal 
spending” used here refers to the combination of expenditure using local government revenue 
and fiscal transfer from upper-level governments. The data on affordable housing spending 
come from the China Statistical Yearbook for Regional Economy (Zhongguo quyu jingji tongji 
nianjian). 
 
51 Ya Ping Wang and Alan Murie, “The New Affordable and Social Housing Provision System in China: 
Implications for Comparative Housing Studies,” International Journal of Housing Policy, 11, no. 3 
(2011): 237–254. 
 
52 While ideally the analysis should cover the whole campaign period, data on cities’ fiscal spending on 
affordable housing is available only for 2013. 
 
53 Xinjiang and Tibet are excluded due to missing values in key variables. 
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Figure 2 illustrates the pattern of spending on affordable housing as the share of local 
fiscal expenditure across the 280 cities. The blank areas in the map are either regions that are 
categorized as other types of prefectural-level administrative units (e.g., autonomous 
prefectures and meng, 盟) or cities for which data is not available. The different shadings 
indicate different levels of fiscal spending on affordable housing, categorized by quartile. The 
darker shade indicates that the city spent a higher proportion of its budget on affordable 
housing. It can be seen that the darker-shaded metropolitan regions are not on China’s east 
coast. The data used in Figure 2 also reveals that provincial capitals and vice-provincial-level 
cities put a lower portion of fiscal expenditure on affordable housing than smaller cities. 
 [Figure 2 about here.] 
 
The first independent variable aims to test the effect of the political tools adopted by the 
Party on local officials’ behavior in the campaign. As discussed earlier, the campaign’s 
mobilization effect should vary depending on the extent to which local officials’ career prospects 
relied on the support of the upper-level government. More specifically, city-level officials whose 
career prospects relied more on the support of the provincial government built more affordable 
housing. To measure the extent to which city-level officials’ career prospects relied on the 
provincial government, I used these officials’ career backgrounds as an indicator. Following the 
work by Huang and coauthors, my assumption was that those who had prior experience working 
inside the provincial government of the same province should feel their interests more closely 
aligned with the provincial government and should respond more actively to the policy targets 
assigned from the latter. By contrast, local officials whose past careers had been primarily based 
in their own localities should be more attached to the interests of local elites, and therefore 
should be less enthusiastic in implementing policies that are in conflict with local political and 
economic interests.54 Following this logic, I coded a variable Provincial experience as 1 if a city-
level official had work experience in the provincial government of the province in which she or 
he was based and as zero if not. Since city-level officials received their targets of affordable 
 
54 Yasheng Haung, Inflation and Investment Controls in China: The Political Economy of Central- 
local Relations during the Reform Era (Cambridge University Press, 1999); Yasheng Huang and 
Yumin Sheng, “Political Decentralization and Inflation: Sub-national Evidence from China,” British 




housing directly from their provincial supervisors—in particular, governors—those who had work 
experience in the provincial government should response more actively by spending more on 
affordable housing provision. 
 
The second independent variable tests whether the campaign led to efficient allocation 
of resources in the sense that the local government’s expenditures matched demands for 
affordable housing among local residents. More specifically, I examined whether cities with 
lower levels of housing affordability spent more on affordable housing. I used two variables to 
measure the level of housing affordability: the ratio of the city’s average per-square-meter land 
price to average per capita income among urban residents (Land-price-to-income ratio); and 
the share of homeowners among the urban households of the city (Share of homeowners).55 If 
the campaign led to efficient allocation of housing resources, we should expect local 
governments in cities with lower levels of housing affordability to spend more expenditures on 
affordable housing. 
 
To calculate land-price-to-income ratios, I rely on a dataset of all land transactions that 
occurred in 2012 in the land markets of the cities included in the sample. Information about 
these land transactions was obtained from www.landchina.com (Zhongguo tudi shichang 
wang), a website managed by the Ministry of Land and Resources. Each entry of the dataset 
records information about one land transaction, including the type of the land plot involved, 
the method of the transaction, the listing and final prices, date of the transaction, and location 
of the land plot. For the purposes of this study, I focused on the transactions of all residential 
and commercial land plots sold at auctions, which resulted in a total number of 49,697 
transactions. Based on this information, I was able to calculate for each city the average unit 
price of all residential and commercial land plots sold in 2012, and then calculated the ratio of 
average unit land price to the per capita income of urban residents.56 
 
The second measure of housing affordability is the share of urban households who own 
 
55 In the literature of housing and real-estate studies, the most commonly adopted measure for housing 
affordability is the ratio of house prices to income. However, reliable data on house prices at the city level 
in China is limited. I acknowledge the limitations of the measures.   
 




their homes (Share of homeowners), on the assumption that a lower share normally indicates 
fewer households can afford to. Data for this variable comes from the Sixth National Population 
Census, conducted in 2010. In constructing the measure, I used data from households who live 
in urban districts of metropolises rather than nearby counties or county-level cities. 
 
Figures 3 and 4 plot the Land-price-to-income ratio and Share of homeowners 
respectively in the y-axis against GDP per capita in the x-axis. Both figures suggest that the 
residents of more affluent cities in the coastal regions, including Shanghai, Hangzhou, 
Shenzhen, and Xiamen, tended to face higher levels of housing difficulty. The two variables are 
strongly correlated (correlation coefficient 0.46) with each other, further confirming their 
measurement validity. 
 
[Figure 3 about here.] 
[Figure 4 about here.] 
I also control for inflation-adjusted GDP per capita, fiscal expenditure per capita, and 
the size of urban population, all in log forms.57 All of the independent variables, except for the 
work experiences of local leaders, lag by one year. 
 
Table 2 reports the results of the regression analysis. The first two columns use as the 
dependent variable local spending on affordable housing as a percentage of total local fiscal 
expenditure, while the last two columns use the log transformation of affordable housing 
spending per capita as the dependent variable. 
 
[Table 2 about here.] 
 
Overall, the results confirm that local officials, especially mayors, who had prior work 
experience inside the provincial government spent a larger portion of their budget on affordable 
housing compared with those who had no such experience. Substantively, the former spent on 
average an additional 0.2-0.6 percent of local fiscal expenditure, or 5%-14.9% more expenditure 
per capita, on affordable housing. These lead to substantial differences given that on average a 
 
57 Data for the first two variables come from the China Statistical Yearbook for Regional Economy, while 
data for urban population come from Chinese Population Statistics by Counties and Cities (quanguo fen 
xianshi renkou tongji ziliao). 
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city spent only 4.2% of its fiscal expenditure on the provision of affordable housing. Moreover, 
the mobilization effect is stronger for mayors than for Party secretaries. This is because 
compared with Party secretaries, mayors played a more important role in the implementation 
of the affordable housing campaign.58  
 
Second, the two measures of housing affordability point consistently to the finding that 
localities that spend more resources on affordable housing are not those where local residents 
faced greater housing difficulties. To the contrary, the greater the housing difficulties that local 
residents faced, the smaller the proportion of the city’s budget that was spent on affordable 
housing, as well as lower per capita spending on this. Substantively, a one percentage point 
increase in the land-price-to-income ratio reduces per capita local spending on affordable 
housing by 3%, and the share of affordable housing spending in local fiscal expenditure by 0.12 
percentage points. Similarly, when the proportion of homeowners among local households 
decreases by one percentage point, the local fiscal spending on affordable housing decreases by 
0.82 per cent on a per capita basis or by 0.04 percentage points in terms of the share of total 
local fiscal expenditure. These results confirm that the campaign was more effective in cities 
where land prices were lower and housing was more affordable than in cities where land prices 
were higher and residents faced greater housing difficulties. In short, the statistics back up my 
finding that the campaign’s varying effect in different types of localities shows misallocation of 
resources and distorted policy outcomes. As discussed earlier, this is because, on the one hand, 
the campaign leaves significant room for political bargaining over the allocation of targets 
between the central and local governments and between different levels of local governments. 
In the bargaining, the calculations of benefits and costs by local officials, rather than residents’ 
actual needs, played a dominant role in determining policy outcomes. On the other hand, while 
the central government was strongly committed to the national goal of building 36 million units 
within five years, it became more concerned with fulfilling the goal itself than allocation 
efficiency or the effectiveness of the campaign in meeting the actual housing needs of local 
 
58 Party secretaries and mayors hold different responsibilities and therefore face different political 
incentives. It has been argued that Party leaders are in charge of Party priorities and sustaining Party 
rule, whereas government executives make economic and social policies and undertake direct daily 
governance. See Pierre Landry, Decentralized Authoritarianism in China (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008); Cai Zuo, “Promoting City Leaders: The Structure of Political Incentives in 
China,” The China Quarterly, 224, (2015): 955-984. In the policy area of affordable housing, it is mayors 
rather than Party secretaries who sign responsibility contracts with central and provincial governments. 
Moreover, when higher-level governments engaged in “warning conversations (yuetan)” with local 
officials about affordable housing, it is mayors (or governors at the provincial level), rather than Party 




Among the control variables, stronger fiscal capacity significantly increases the 
government’s effort to build affordable housing, other things being equal. When a city’s per 
capita local fiscal expenditure increases by one percentage point, the per capita spending of the 
city on affordable housing increases by 1.39-1.46 per cent, or 0.02 percentage points as a share 
of local spending. But both GDP per capita and the size of the urban population have negative 
effects on local governments’ spending on affordable housing. In other words, local 
governments in poorer and smaller cities tend to be more active in complying with the national 
campaign to build more affordable housing. In more developed and populated localities where 
prices for private properties are typically higher, local governments are less willing to provide 
otherwise profitable land for affordable housing. By contrast, poorer and smaller cities earn less 
profit from selling land to real-estate developers, so they are more willing to respond to the 
wishes of the national government by providing more affordable housing. 
 
[Table 3 about here.] 
 
Table 3 shows the results of regressions using data from prefecture-level cities only. As 
mentioned earlier, some huge Chinese cities have the bureaucratic rank of a province (i.e., 
Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Chongqing) or hold a vice-provincial level status (e.g. Qingdao, 
Dalian, Ningbo, and Nanjing).59 The leaders of these cities have higher bureaucratic ranks than 
leaders in ordinary prefecture-level cities, and the governments in these cities typically enjoy 
greater administrative and economic power. More importantly, unlike prefectural-level cities, 
the affordable housing targets of cities that count as provinces and vice-provincial-level cities 
were directly decided by the central government. As a result, it may be reasonable to distinguish 
between these cities and prefecture-level cities in the analysis. To address this concern and show 
the robustness of the results, I ran another set of regressions using prefecture-level cities only. 
While the number of observations reduces to 248, the main findings remain unchanged, 
suggesting my findings are robust. 
 
59 In total there are 16 vice-provincial level cities in China. They were previously called jihua danlie shi, 
meaning that the governments of these cities enjoy the same power as governments at the provincial 
level in various aspects of administrative and economic management areas. In this study, I count 
provincial capitals also as vice-provincial cities because the Party secretaries of provincial capitals are 
provincial Party standing committee members and therefore vice-provincial officials. The mayors of 
provincial capitals, however, are normally prefecture-level officials unless the capital city is also a 




Due to data availability, the above city-level analysis uses data for 2013 only. The limited 
data may cause one to suspect that the identified relationships between levels of housing 
difficulty and local spending on affordable housing in 2013 is perhaps because less affordable 
had responded by already building a lot of affordable housing before 2013. To address this 
concern, I use provincial-level data between 2010 and 2014 to partially replicate the above 
analysis and as a robustness check. 
 
[Table 4 about here.] 
 
Table 4 shows the results of the provincial-level analysis, using the two measures of 




Despite the prevalence and importance of campaigns in China’s governance, the existing 
literature has yet to reach agreement on the effects of campaigns on policy outcomes. In 
particular, few studies have sought to systematically examine the policy outcomes of campaigns 
using quantitative data. To fill the lacuna in the literature, this article conducted an analysis of 
the national campaign launched by the central government between 2011 and 2015 to boost 
affordable housing provision. Using a city-level dataset on government spending on affordable 
housing, the empirical analysis examines how the campaign affected the local governments’ 
efforts to build affordable housing. The results suggest that the campaign led successfully to a 
political mobilization outcome and unsuccessfully to a resource-misallocation outcome. On the 
one hand, the political mechanisms that linked officials’ career prospects with their 
performance in constructing affordable housing  strengthened the incentives of local officials to 
provide more affordable housing in their jurisdictions. On the other hand, the effects of the 
campaign on local officials’ behavior varied between different types of localities—local officials 
in cities where residents faced greater housing difficulties responded less enthusiastically to the 
campaign; by contrast, local officials in cities where housing was more affordable and there was 
less need for government intervention nonetheless spent more on affordable housing. Such 
 
60 The analysis also controls for GDP per capita, fiscal expenditure per capita, and size of urban 
population, all in logged forms by one year. 
 
25  
variation in the local responses to the campaign led to distorted policy outcomes and 
misallocation of government resources.  
While this research focuses on affordable housing provision, the theoretical analysis and 
empirical findings can be readily generalized to other policy and governance areas where 
campaign-style implementation is frequently employed. In a study of intellectual property 
rights (IPR) enforcement, Dimitrov suggested that instead of relying on campaigns, intellectual 
property rights enforcement should be carried out through legal-bureaucratic approaches in 
which the less politicized judicial system should play a leading role.61 Similarly, Wong and 
Karplus argued that one problem in China’s environment governance lies in the misalignment 
between the allocation of resources and the incentives of local bureaucrats.62 The findings of 
this research regarding the outcomes of campaign-style implementation may also apply to these 
policy areas. 
 
The findings of this research also have important implications for governance 
performance and regime resilience in China. In explaining the extraordinary resilience of the 
Chinese regime, scholars noted a gradual shift of government policy to place greater emphasis 
on social and welfare expenditures in recent decades,63 and have coined concepts such as 
“authoritarian responsiveness” or “authoritarian accountability” to account for the 
strengthened government effort to address pressing social needs.64 According to this 
scholarship, such government efforts take various forms ranging from “constituency services” 
via institutions such as the mayor’s mailbox or the petition system, to national programs that 
aim to more systematically improve the provision of public goods and social welfare.65 The 
 
61 Martin Dimitrov, Piracy and the State: The Politics of Intellectual Property Rights in China 
(Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
62  Christine Wong and Valerie J. Karplus, “China’s War on Air Pollution: Can Existing Governance 
Structures Support New Ambitions?” The China Quarterly, 231 (2017): 662–684. 
 
63 Anna L. Ahlers, Thomas Heberer, and Gunter Schubert, “Whither Local Governance in Contemporary 
China? Reconfiguration for More Effective Policy Implementation,” Journal of Chinese Governance, 1 
no.1 (2016): 55–77; Cai Zuo, “Promoting City Leaders: The Structure of Political Incentives in China,” 
The China Quarterly, 224, no.4 (2015): 955–984.  
64  Greg Distelhorst and Yue Hou, “Constituency Service under Nondemocratic Rule: Evidence from 
China,” The Journal of Politics, 79, no.3 (2017): 1024–1040. Chen, Jidong, Pan, Jennifer, and Xu, Yiqing. 
Sources of authoritarian responsiveness: A field experiment in China (American Journal of Political 
Science, 2015). 
 
65  Greg Distelhorst and Yue Hou, “Constituency Service under Nondemocratic Rule: Evidence from 
China,” The Journal of Politics, 79, no.3 (2017): 1024–1040; Anna L. Ahlers, Thomas Heberer, and 
Gunter Schubert, “Whither Local Governance in Contemporary China? Reconfiguration for More 
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changing government priorities as well as associated welfare programs have arguably 
showcased government accountability and won popular support for the regime.66 Through a 
detailed analysis of the affordable housing campaign—one of the most prominent national 
welfare programs adopted in recent years—this research casts doubt on the effectiveness of 
such programs in addressing the underlying governance problems. The key to understand the 
compromised effectiveness lies in campaign-style implementation and its varying effects on 
the behavior of local officials across different types of localities. As a result, campaigns have 
led to significant gaps between government efforts and social needs. In other words, the 
accountability demonstrated in campaigns can be at best called “accountability at a distance”, 
meaning that national leaders prioritize the accomplishment of ambitious national-level 
targets, whereas local agents seek to achieve a balance between the political pressure from 
above and local interests. As a result, while campaigns may boost regime popularity in the 
short run, they also lead to distorted policy outcomes and misallocation of public resources. 
To achieve longer-term regime resilience, the CCP needs to reconsider its campaign-style 
policy implementation model and instead promote routinized and institutionalized 
implementation mechanisms to hold local officials more accountable to the interests and 










Effective Policy Implementation,” Journal of Chinese Governance, 1 no.1 (2016): 55–77; Matthias 
Stepan, Enze Han, and Tim Reeskens, “Building the New Socialist Countryside: Tracking Public Policy 
and Public Opinion Changes in China,” The China Quarterly, 226 (2016): 456– 476. 
 
66 Matthias Stepan, Enze Han, and Tim Reeskens, “Building the New Socialist Countryside: Tracking 
Public Policy and Public Opinion Changes in China,” The China Quarterly, 226 (2016): 456– 476; Xiaobo 
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Table 1: Spending on Affordable Housing and Constructed Units (1994- 2015) 





funding  Started Completed 
1994-2008 - - -  - around 10 
2009 - 55.06 -  4.52 3.30 
2010 - 80.20 -  5.90 3.70 
2011 334.29 179.13 155.16  10.43 4.32 
2012 380.04 233.26 146.78  7.81 6.01 
2013 381.67 200.03 181.64  6.66 5.44 
2014 431.95 222.22 209.73  7.40 5.51 
2015 488.10 254.83 233.27  7.83 7.72 
Total 2016.05 1089.47 926.58  40.13 29.00 

































Table 2: Explaining Affordable Housing Provision (All Cities) 
 
Affordable housing spending as % of total spending  
per capita spending 
(log)  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
GDP per capita -0.024*** -0.024*** -0.605*** -0.581*** 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.103) (0.102) 
Fiscal expenditure per capita 0.020*** 0.024*** 1.391*** 1.461*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.115) (0.115) 
Population -0.002 -0.004** -0.064 -0.110** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.051) (0.049) 
Provincial experience (mayor) 0.006** 0.005** 0.149** 0.148** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.061) (0.062) 
Provincial experience (Party 
secretary) 0.002 0.002 0.069 0.050 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.065) (0.064) 
Land-price-to-income ratio -0.116***  -3.056***  
 (0.032)  (0.840)  
Share of homeowners  0.040***  0.819** 
  (0.013)  (0.358) 
Constant 0.343*** 0.317*** 4.554*** 4.165*** 
 (0.050) (0.052) (1.064) (1.189) 
R-squared 0.265 0.262 0.483 0.473 
N. of cases 276 277 276 277 
1 * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; 























Table 3: Explaining Affordable Housing Provision (Prefectural-level Cities Only) 
 
Affordable housing spending as % of total fiscal spending  
per capita spending 
(log)  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
GDP per capita -0.025*** -0.024*** -0.600*** -0.572*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.107) (0.105) 
Fiscal expenditure per capita 0.022*** 0.026*** 1.390*** 1.479*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.123) (0.119) 
Population -0.003 -0.004* -0.102* -0.139** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.059) (0.056) 
Provincial experience (mayor) 0.005* 0.005* 0.149** 0.149** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.064) (0.064) 
Provincial experience (Party 
secretary) 
0.002 0.001 0.060 0.047 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.069) (0.068) 
Land-price-to-income ratio -0.130***  -3.160***  
 (0.040)  (1.002)  
Share of homeowners  0.040***  0.928** 
  (0.015)  (0.395) 
Constant 0.353*** 0.325*** 5.043*** 4.412*** 
 (0.055) (0.057) (1.138) (1.266) 
R-squared 0.254 0.248 0.494 0.488 
N. of cases 247 248 247 248 
1 * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; 
2 robust standard errors are in parentheses; 



























as % of total fiscal spending  per capita spending (log)  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
GDP per capita -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.004 -0.008 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) 
Fiscal expenditure 0.024*** 0.025*** 0.048*** 0.050*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.010) 
Population -0.026*** -0.028*** -0.061*** -0.062*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.009) 
Land-price-to-income 
ratio 
-0.081***  -0.125***  
 (0.018)  (0.025)  
Share of homeowners  0.030**  0.019 
  (0.012)  (0.016) 
2011 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.012*** 0.011*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
2012 0.011*** 0.009*** 0.012*** 0.010** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
2013 0.005* 0.003 0.005 0.004 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) 
2014 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.005 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) 
Constant 0.386*** 0.357*** 0.463*** 0.472*** 
 (0.033) (0.040) (0.062) (0.065) 
R-squared 0.682 0.661 0.692 0.660 
N. of cases 150 150 150 150 
1 * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; 
2 robust standard errors are in parentheses; 
3 observations with missing value are excluded. 
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